As Christina Greta rightly acknowledges, there is not a single definition of sex that satisfactorily captures every activity that universally counts or does not count as sex. In one of Greta’s definitions of the concept, she states that sex is “the conscious, consenting, mutually acknowledged pursuit of shared sexual pleasure” (6). She goes on to poke holes into this definition by citing examples of activities and behaviors that she considers as sex and that do not fit this definition. She also considers it as problematic for incorporating other activities that for her cannot count as sex. Consciousness, consent, and a mutual drive for pleasure emerge as the metrics that Greta employs in setting the boundaries for what may constitute sex. However, in examining the suitability of this definition, I will consider a story that examines the condition of consciousness in a bid to capture the problems exhibited in this definition. Based on the analysis, I determine that Greta’s definition, in this case, is too narrow in its attempt to describe what sex essentially means.
A few years ago, I went for a night out with a couple of my friends. After hours of wild partying, I told one of my friends to gather the crew and call a cab that would take us home since I did not think it was safe to drive though we had a car. She obliged and after a few minutes the cab came. As we prepared to leave, we realized that one of our friends, Grace, was missing. One of the waitresses told us that Grace left with a gentleman she had been dancing with and was probably at the parking lot. We all hurriedly headed there to check out only to find her lying on the bonnet of a car with her skirt pulled up. The dude was inside the car, probably looking for a condom, and when he saw us he came and explained to us that Grace had begged him to make love to her. Although she was obviously drunk, Grace confirmed this to us. The incident got me wondering whether or not what Grace had done constituted sex. Greta’s definition phenomenally shades some light on the incident.
While Grace was obviously drunk (unconscious), she had consented to having sex with the stranger. Being drunk may have made the decision unconscious, meaning that she may not have done the same when sober. Even so, it is obvious that there was some degree of consciousness in her actions. For instance, if she was totally unconscious, she could not have suggested that they get some privacy and even some protection. While Greta’s definition of sex may consider Grace’s experience as not constituting sex since she was not fully conscious of her actions as constituting to sex at the time, I find it insufficient when it comes to establishing what consciousness entails. Does being drunk to some extent imply that someone is “unconscious” of his or her actions and they cannot consent consciously to sex? If so, at what point did Grace stop being conscious and could the foreplay have counted as sex? Greta’s definition and the subsequent analysis of it do not consider the possibility that the degree of consciousness can vary with the level of intoxication and fails to offer satisfactory answers to these questions. Therefore, I find this particular definition that defines sex based on the indeterminate condition of consciousness to be too vague.
A more comprehensive definition of sex is that sex constitutes all activities of physical intimacy that are consensual and aimed at the emotional and physical pleasure of at least one of the parties. This definition seeks to fill some of the conceptual gaps left by Greta’s definition by omitting controversial variables such as consciousness. For instance, since it is not possible to determine whether or not a person who engages in sex considers what they are doing as sex, it is not necessary to consider consciousness as a condition for sex. For instance, a definition that includes such a condition eliminates all sexual encounters that are triggered by intoxication of alcohol or any substance that may interfere with rationality. In my view, these activities count as sex.
The definition I have proposed also avoids controversies emanating from considering mutual pleasure as a condition for an intimate experience to count as sex. For example, in instances whereby a person intending to derive physical or emotional pleasure from sex pays a sex worker for sex, it is certain that the latter is not driven by pursuit for pleasure but the need to get some money. Yet, this counts as sex. Therefore, even for the person who engages in sex for money, the activity counts since they agree to it and it involves physical intimacy. Consent, therefore, emerges as an important component of the definition of all sexual activities as it sets boundaries for activities that may be considered as coercion.
One of the major problems with my definition of sex is that it takes a narrow approach to the conceptualization of sex by using the term “physical intimacy.” Taking for example Greta’s experience as a nude dancer, it begs the question whether or not physical intimacy was possible in the instance whereby she and her client masturbated and had a pleasurable moment (8). Since there was a physical boundary between the two, physical intimacy could not have been possible. Therefore, what they did could only constitute emotional intimacy and judging from the sense that consent and pleasure were involved, the instance definitely may count as sex. Therefore, the definition I have suggested is insufficiently too narrow in conceptualizing the nature of the activities that may count as sex.
Works Cited
Greta, Christina. “Are We Having Sex Now or What?” The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary
Readings, edited by Alan Soble, 4th ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002, pp.3-8.
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